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Abstract:  
The aim of this paper is to call for the need of a theoretical model of pharmaceutical products safety in 
which the two systems of regulation and liability operate complementarily. The question is why two 
legal tools that are meant to achieve and protect the same goal (protection of consumers) are shaped in 
a way that hinders, instead of promoting, a positive interaction between the two. At present we have 
two separate sets of rules that operate independently: pre-marketing regulation with post-marketing 
surveillance duties, and ex-post facto liability, linked to the pre-marketing available knowledge. Since 
the key issue in both regulatory and liability assessments related to pharmaceuticals is the one of 
“relevant knowledge”, we claim that the legal framework should be shaped in the way that better 
promotes the availability of such a knowledge. In the effort of identifying a global paradigm of 
pharmaceutical safety (coherent with the global nature of the relevant market), a comparison of the 
legal frameworks in force in the two major “regional” drug markets (US and EU) is not only necessary, 
but valuable in order to identify the shortcomings of “local” solutions, and their inconsistencies vis à 
vis the transnational nature of the issue. The fact that the two scenarios present substantial institutional 
differences does not hinder such a value.  If we consider that the market is globalized at both the stage 
of production and at the one of distribution, the construction of a global governance of pharmaceutical 
safety has to confront with legal and institutional diversities.  
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Introduction  
 
The pharmaceuticals safety regime is beset with fundamental problems which, when globally 
considered, present a clear and present issue of  consumer protection. This is the basic claim that this 
paper attempts to raise, together with the question: why and how should we attempt to better enhance 
pharmaceutical's consumers safety in a globalised context?  
It is impossible to address the “how” question here. What matters is to raise the issue and make 
some tentative proposals. As for the “why” is there a need to enhance consumer safety, this paper tries 
to demonstrate that the globalised nature of  the pharmaceutical market imposes to reconsider the shape 
and functioning of  the existing legal framework that is meant to ensure safety. It has been recognised 
that nowadays the pharmaceutical innovation is handled by a restricted oligopoly of  multinational 
industries1, but new products are marketed after they undergo clinical trials in different countries 
obeying different rules and standards2 (e.g. US, EU, Russia, India, China, Brazil), and they often are the 
result of  combining active ingredients produced, again, in different places. The safety of  drugs' 
consumers shall therefore be understood as a globalised mass-phenomenon, and addressed accordingly. 
We believe that there is a need to rethink the global governance of  pharmaceutical safety both on the 
regulatory side and on the one of  remedies. A fragmentation of  solutions is not desirable in a field 
where it is acknowledged that: 1) the innovators are few, and 2) the issues are globally similar3. 
This paper proposes a comparative study focused on the European Union and the United 
States. Two questions shall be preliminarily addressed. On the one hand one must ask if  the two 
scenarios are comparable, and, on the other hand, what would be the use or value of  such a 
comparison. We propose a joint answer. Since, as already suggested, we believe that there is a need to 
seek for the identification of  a global paradigm of pharmaceutical safety (consistent with the global 
nature of  the relevant market), a comparison of  the legal frameworks in force in the two major 
“regional” drug markets (US and EU) is not only necessary, but valuable in order to identify the 
shortcomings of  “local” solutions4, and their inconsistencies vis à vis the transnational nature of  the 
                                                
1 O’Donnell J.T., Drug injury – liability, analysis and prevention, Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company, Inc., 2001, p. 121 and 
following; nowadays, the total amount of sales has increased also in export trade. In 2006 they were estimated 29.4 billion 
Euros, whereby 16.2 billion Euros of it resulted from export trade. Worldwide the total amount of sales was 643 billion U.S. 
dollars in 2006: see Purnhagen K., The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law: Is an International Approval System Modelled 
after the European System Worth Considering?, 63 Food and Drug Law Journal, 3, 2008, pp 623. 
2 See for example: Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Safe Innovative and Accessible Medicines: a Renewed Vision for the 
Pharmaceutical Sector, Brussels, 10/12/2008. 
3 On the issue see http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html on the reasons that led to the creation of the 
International Conference on Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of Pharmaceuticals for Human Use 
(ICH). 
4 New products are marketed after they undergo clinical trials in different countries obeying different rules and standards 
(e.g. US, EU, Russia, India, China, Brazil), and they often are the result of combining active ingredients produced, again, in 
different places. Assuming that under normal circumstances (i.e. local, or, in other words, when confronted with drugs 
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issue. The fact that the two scenarios present substantial institutional differences does not hinder such a 
value.  As a matter of  fact, consumers are damaged in the same way regardless to such differences. If 
we consider that the market is globalised at both the stage of  production and at the one of  distribution, 
the construction of  a global governance of  pharmaceutical safety has to confront with legal and 
institutional diversities.  
The two main bodies of  law to be considered here are safety regulation and products liability. 
As for the former, substantial differences exist among the two main administrative bodies in charge of 
it (the Food and Drug Administration and the European Medicines Agency), both on the way they are 
organised and on the powers they can actually exercise, with inevitable differences among the outcomes 
of  their decisions5. Pharmaceutical products lability, on the other hand is still a highly fragmented field. 
Few has been said on the link between these two bodies of  law (in pharmaceutical law), and mostly to 
acknowledge the absence of  such a link.  
 The aim of  this paper is to succinctly depict the level of  fragmentation of  pharmaceutical law, 
and thus suggest the need of  a theoretical model of pharmaceutical products safety in which the two 
systems operate complementarily. The question is why two legal tools that are meant to achieve and 
protect the same goal (protection of  consumers) are shaped in a way that hinders, instead of  promoting, 
a positive interaction between the two. There is in our opinion a need  to move forward the traditional 
separation between private and public law tools, by considering the goal in its full empirical dimension, 
which cannot be confined within the boundaries of  one solution or the other. Up to now, the issue of 
pharmaceutical safety has been approached in a classic manner: using “traditional” legal instruments 
and making the empirical matter fit into them in a “traditional” way. We therefore have two separate 
sets of  rules that operate independently: pre-marketing regulation with post-marketing surveillance 
duties, and ex-post facto liability, linked to the pre-marketing available knowledge (development risks 
or state-of-the-art)6. We propose that it is the legal framework that must be shaped around the 
empirical issue, rather than the contrary. Therefore, since the key issue in both regulatory and liability 
assessments related to pharmaceuticals is the one of  “relevant knowledge”, we claim that the legal 
                                                                                                                                                            
entirely produced and tested within the European or US territory) the systems of safety regulation work (i.e. by providing 
the best possible level of consumer safety), quid when such systems have to face the issue of a global process of production 
and testing? What happens in practice is that, in order to overcome the problem, the EMEA and the FDA have put in place 
a network of bilateral agreements with foreign agencies, meant to promote mutual recognition of the various steps that are 
held in different places obeying different rules. Such a system of bilateral agreements raises questions with respect to the 
black-letter regulation provided for the European or US market. The international harmonisation of general guide-lines 
justifies such a practice, however the differences in the substance between the specific regulations that govern the process of 
production imply different outcomes in terms of safety. The claim is therefore that local regulatory systems fail to address in 
a satisfying way the issue of the multi-local production of new pharmaceuticals. 
5 See infra, and for a general perspective on the matter a good overview can be found in 
http://biopharminternational.findpharma.com/biopharm/Article/Navigating-Differences-Between-FDA-and-EMEA-for-
Re/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/371018  
6   The issue will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
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framework should be shaped in the way that better promotes the availability of  such a knowledge7. 
 In this perspective, an issue that cannot be ignored is the federal preemption of  state tort law, a 
doctrine first spoken in drug litigation in the US in 2006. More specifically, in the preamble to its 
January 2006 prescription drug labelling rule, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) asserted that 
“FDA approval of  labelling under the act . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law”8. This 
approach raises several safety concerns in light of  the unavoidable level of  scientific uncertainty that 
inherently characterises a new pharmaceutical. We submit that preemption of  tort law weakens the 
protection of  consumers' safety, and we intend to oppose an approach grounded on the theory of 
“functional complementarity”9. This issue is critical, especially in a context, like the US, where tort law 
has historically played a major regulatory role, balancing trough litigation the numerous shortcomings 
of  regulation10. It is worth to underline that there is nothing similar to the doctrine of  preemption in the 
European Union (in the field of  drugs' litigation). Regulation and liability are two systems that operate 
independently (as will be discussed in the proceeding) and regulatory compliance per se is not a defence 
in products liability claims. It must also be recalled that a “preemptive shift” in European drug litigation 
wouldn't have at all the same effect that it has in the US, as regards consumers' compensation. Contrary 
to the US, in the EU product liability is a rather minor field in litigation. Consumers are indeed often 
protected by different private or public legal tools, namely insurance or social security systems11.  
 Finally, two issue shall be suggested. First, we believe that there is a need to simplify the legal 
framework in a field that is deeply globalised12. A more conscious use of  tort law rules (by definition 
simpler than specific sectorial regulations) is in our opinion the key in order to achieve this goal. 
Secondly, a topic that has been barely developed, and that shall be investigated more thoroughly is the 
one that could be referred to as “pure knowledge loss”. By that we mean the knowledge that is 
dispersed where there is no clear link between the regulatory and the litigation systems, not to mention 
the knowledge that doesn't even have a chance to rise where regulatory compliance preempts tort law. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the first part we will suggest some differences existing 
between the regulatory and liability regimes of  the United States and European Union, the two biggest 
pharmaceutical markets. Since the major differences are to be found in the liability regimes, the analysis 
                                                
7 For a discussion of the concept of “relevant knowledge” see Mildred M., “The development risk defence”, in Fairgrieve 
D., Products Liability in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
8 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 
3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (effective June 30, 2006) (21 C.F.R. Pts. 201, 314, 601), for a comment see Sharkey C.M., 
“Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law”, De Paul Law Review, 56:227, 2007.  
9 Cafaggi F., Institutional Framework of European Private Law, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 191 and following. The theory 
of functional complementarity: a) on a positive level it shows the reciprocal influences of the two techniques, and b) on a 
normative level calls for a high degree of coordination. 
10 See for a comprehensive discussion Viscusi W.K., Regulation Through Litigation, Brookings Institution Press, 2002. 
11 As thoroughly explained by Reimann M., “Liability for detective products at the beginning of the twenty-first century: 
emergence of a worldwide standard?”, American Journal of Comparative Law, 2003. 
12 This interesting idea is generally discussed in the book of Richard Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World, Harvard 
University Press, 1995. 
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will focus mainly on the products liability rules. In the second part we will then confront with a specific 
issue: the federal preemption of  state tort law in pharmaceutical products liability claims in the United 
States. In the third part, we will raise some critiques to the existing legal frameworks of  pharmaceutical 
safety. 
 
 
1. Divergences... 
 
a)...in regulation 
 
A first glance will now be given to the safety regulation regimes. Both scenarios, the US and the 
EU, seem to be deeply harmonised on the regulatory side. More precisely, in the United States safety 
regulation is handled by a centralised Agency (the FDA), the authority of  which covers the whole 
national territory (and, therefore, it would be more accurate to speak in terms of  centralisation rather 
than harmonisation), whereas in the European Union, the role of  the EMA, a “networking agency” as it 
has been defined13, has led to substantial steps forward in the harmonisation of  the national 
pharmaceutical regulatory systems14. 
The Food and Drug Administration is an executive-branch agency that is led by a 
Commissioner who is appointed by the president, with Senate confirmation, and who reports to the 
Secretary of  Health and Human Services. The agency's role is to establish the safety and efficacy of  a 
new drug, supervising a long process that goes from the preclinical to the clinical trials, and finally to 
the pharmacovigilance of  such a drug15. In addition to issuing approval of  the drug, the FDA must also 
approve the label that accompanies it. This label typically provides information on the drug’s 
pharmacological properties (such as the rate at which the drug enters and exits the body), 
contraindications (medical conditions that preclude use of  the drug) and side effects, as well as brief 
summaries of  the clinical trials reported to the FDA. The label also lists the indications (or diseases) 
that the drug is approved to treat. Thus, approval by the FDA is not merely approval of  the drug, it is 
approval of  the drug for specific uses. 
 A few words shall be spent for the European regulatory framework. In fact, two are the 
possible marketing authorisation procedures: the centralised and the mutual recognition procedures. 
The first one is compulsory for all medicinal products derived from biotechnology and for other 
                                                
13  Permanand G., EU Pharmaceutical Regulation, Manchester University Press, 2006, p. 65.  
14  For an overview of the step by step harmonisation process see Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, 
Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 39 and following. 
15  For a comprehensive analysis of the FDA's task in regulating pharmaceutical drug safety see IOM (Institute of Medicine 
of the National Academies), The Future of Drug Safety – Promoting and Protecting the health of the Public, The National Academy 
Press, 2007. 
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innovative new medicines16. The marketing authorisation is granted by the Commission, once the EMA 
takes its decision, and is valid throughout the whole of  the EU. On the other hand, the second 
procedure is based on the principle of  mutual recognition of  national authorisations between Member 
States. Under such procedure, a marketing authorisation granted by one Member State is extended to 
one or more other Member States selected by the applicant17. Because of  the significant differences 
between national regulations related to marketing authorisation, with the EC Directive 2001/83 on the 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, the EU attempted to harmonise to a 
larger extent the national procedures18. Nowadays all highly innovative (and thus potentially more 
dangerous) products must undergo the centralised procedure19, therefore undergoing the same test of 
safety and risk/benefit20.  
 It shall be noticed that, given the recalled transnational nature of  the approval process, 
involving regulatory bodies in different legal frameworks, the initiative of  the International Conference 
on Harmonisation of  Technical Requirements for Registration of  Pharmaceuticals for Human Use 
(ICH) seems to be slowly softening the differences still existing on the two sides of  the Ocean, even 
though the process is long, difficult and hindered by both national and private interests21. ICH is 
seeking to harmonise drug testing through protocols and voluntary agreements. As it has been well 
argued22, drug testing is intimately linked to broader conceptions of  how physicians, regulatory 
agencies, drug companies and consumers should interact.  The interaction among those subjects 
composes the so called “therapeutic culture” of  a country. In this regard, ICH has the potential to 
improve medical care by finding an appropriate balance among competing regulatory styles. But the 
task is hard and the challenges are tough. ICH participants are facing internal and external contrasts 
suggesting that enacting regulatory harmonisation to a higher level faces serious difficulties. On an 
                                                
16  See first Regulation 2309/93/EEC, and then Regulation 726/2004/EC, art. 3 and Annex. 
17  Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 40 “This state of affairs developed historically: when regulation 
was first introduced Directive 65/65/EEC crystallised the introduction of national authorisation systems, which was 
arguably all that could be contemplated either in practice or politically at the stage, and reforms to the mutual recognition 
procedures have slowly but gradually been introduced since then, for example under Directive 87/22/EEC, which required 
that applications for high technology products had to be referred to the CPMP for an opinion before a (national) marketing 
authorisation could be granted. The centralised procedure introduced by Regulation 2309/93/EEC was effectively 
established on a trial basis, in that it was restricted to certain categories of product, which are subject of extension, as noted 
above. The logical outcome would be that the mutual recognition system will be abandoned in the future.”; for a different 
perspective, suggesting decentralized procedure should inspire an international system of durg marketing approval as 
suggested by Purnhagen K., The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law: Is an International Approval System Modelled after 
the European System Worth Considering?, 2008. 
18  Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 40. 
19  See Regulation 726/2004/EC, art. 3 and Annex. 
20  See Feldshreiber, The Law and Regulation of Medicines, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 103 ff; and Hodges C., European 
Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 99 ff. 
21  See on the issue Purnhagen K., The Challenge of Globalization in Pharmaceutical Law: Is an International Approval System Modelled 
after the European System Worth Considering?; Daemmrich A.A., Pharmacopolitics – Drug Regulation in the United States and Germany, 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2006, pp. 143-174. 
22  Daemmrich A.A., Pharmacopolitics – Drug Regulation in the United States and Germany, The University of North Carolina 
Press, 2004, pp. 243. 
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7 
“internal” front (within ICH member states), consumer representatives challenge the technocratic 
system that excludes their concerns and is built in such a way that it strengthens the industry's lobbying 
power23. On an “external” front, countries such as Brazil, India and China, originally excluded from the 
ICH forum, are now growing to become the new major innovators in the field of  pharmaceuticals. 
Moreover, at present these countries already host significant portions of  the research and testing 
process of  new drugs24. How ICH participants respond and adapt to expectations for participatory 
democracy from constituents in very different political and cultural settings will determine the success 
of  the venture.  
 For the purposes of  our study, it is interesting to rapidly sketch the organisational differences 
that exist between the two main western agencies: 
 
Comparison of  the EMEA and the FDA25 
 EMEA FDA 
Established in: 
 
Dependent on: 
 
 
Budget for 2006 
 
 
Permanent Staff 
 
Evaluation of  drug documentation by 
 
 
 
 
Compulsory procedures 
 
 
 
Time of  approval 
1991 
 
European Commission, Directorate General 
for Enterprise 
 
€62 million (70% as fees from the companies) 
 
 
250 
 
External experts (two appointed by each 
Member State included in the scientific 
committee – CHMP – renewed every 3 years) 
 
 
Biotechnology products and products derived 
from human blood and tissues 
 
 
7 months to 15 months 
1931 
 
Department of   Human Health and 
Human Services 
 
over $2 billion (10% as fees from the 
companies) 
 
9000 
 
Internal (CDER review team) and external 
(Advisory Committee) expert 
 
 
 
All pharmaceutical products 
 
 
 
10 months (standard medicines), 6 months 
(priority medicines) 
 
 Thanks to the initiative of  the ICH in softening the differences between the regulatory 
frameworks of  pharmaceutical safety (especially in the US, the EU and Japan)26, general guidelines are 
to a significant extent harmonised (at least in the major markets such as those mentioned above). 
However specific rules and standards differ, and such differences are intrinsically liable to result in 
                                                
23  Daemmrich A.A., Pharmacopolitics – Drug Regulation in the United States and Germany, The University of North Carolina Press, 
2004, p. 147. 
24 Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Safe Innovative and Accessible Medicines: a Renewed Vision for the Pharmaceutical 
Sector, Brussels, 10/12/2008. 
25  IOM (Institute of Medicine of the National Academies), “Regulatory Authorities for Drug Safety”, in The Future of Drug 
Safety – Promoting and Protecting the health of the Public. 
26 For a comprehensive description check ICH homepage, http://www.ich.org/cache/compo/276-254-1.html (follow 
“Structure of the ICH” hyperlink under “About ICH”). 
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substantial variations in the level of  safety of  a new product27. An example may clarify the claim. 
Whereas both the FDA and the EMA enforce an procedure based on three phases and several 
subphases28 for the approval of  a new drug (harmonised general guide-line), the way the clinical trials 
are held presents a major divergence: whereas the EMA tests the experimental drug against the most 
advanced one of  the same type that is already marketed, the FDA runs the same test against a placebo29 
(specific regulation, sub-step 3 of  step 2 of  the procedure). 
 
b)...in tort law  
 
 There is an antique dispute over the liability regime that would better fit pharmaceutical 
products. The reason for this is easily understandable if  we consider the inherent risk that characterises 
these products30. There is indeed no such thing as absolute safety and this poses serious problems over 
the extent to which a producer can be held liable for damages caused by his products. And such 
problems are even worsened by the extensive regulatory oversight established for pharmaceutical 
products all over the world, because of the time, costs and limitations that derive from such 
regulations31.  
                                                
27 Again for a general perspective on the matter a good overview can be found in 
http://biopharminternational.findpharma.com/biopharm/Article/Navigating-Differences-Between-FDA-and-EMEA-for-
Re/ArticleStandard/Article/detail/371018  
28  Very broadly, the approval process is structured in the following way: 1. preclinical research (lab development and testing 
on animals); 2. clinical research (clinical trials then divided in several sub-steps, 3 in the EU, 4 in the US); 3. 
pharmacovigilance, the post-marketing surveillance system. See for example Arbour M.-E., “Sperimentazione dei Farmaci”, 
Pisa, 2004, pag. 2 and following. 
29  See  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(3)(D)(ii) (pre-market approval); and ibidem § 360c(i)(1)(D). 
30  It is interesting for the purpose of defining the unavoidability of risks in pharmaceutical products to recall the definition 
of “unavoidably unsafe” as provided by comment k of Section 402/A of the Restatement Second.  Comment k states: “Unavoidably 
unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made 
safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the 
vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences when 
it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are 
fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared 
and accompanied by proper directions and warnings, is not defective, nor it s unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of 
many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or 
under the prescription of a physician. t is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of 
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity 
of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically 
recognisable risk. The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and 
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences 
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, 
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.” 
31  See Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 48: “The average cost of discovering and developing a new 
drug is now put at over $800 million and rising at an annual rate of 7.4% above general price inflation: Boston Consulting 
Group, A Revolution in R&D: How Genomics and Genetics are Transforming the Biopharmaceutical Industry, Boston, 2003; DiMasi J., 
Hanson R.W., Grabowski G., “The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs”, Journal of Health 
Economy, 22, 2003. It is well known that the potential profits can be enormous. It has been commented that the increasing 
cost of drug development is likely to promote the situation where companies invest only in the development of those new 
drugs that are expected to yield peak annual sales greater than $500 million: Rawlins M.D., “Cutting the Costs of Drug 
Development?”, Nature, 3, April 2004.” 
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 Whether and how pharmaceuticals should be treated differently from other types of  products 
has “consumed more time and effort than about any other particularised issue of  products liability 
law”32. Such an issue can be summarised as follows. There is a paradox that is inherent to 
pharmaceuticals: “as one of  the greatest triumphs of  the twentieth century, their powerful chemicals 
and biologics save millions of  human beings from suffering and death; yet, these same chemicals also 
cause great suffering and death”33. All prescription drugs possess substantial costs as well as benefits. 
This is because drug hazard are inherent and can be unavoidable. The question being: given the 
unavoidability of  drug hazard, how to strike the optimal balance between risks and benefits?34 
 The urgency of  the question lies in the fact that there is no such thing as a perfect regulator. It 
is widely recognized that legislative, budgetary and political constraints clash with “the ideal of  a perfect 
regulatory body that optimally protects the public from exposure to potentially harmful products”35. 
Nor do product labelling always properly warn consumers from the inherent risks of  taking the drug36. 
Because of  these and other shortcomings in the regulatory structure for the production and distribution 
of  drugs, products liability law needs to play a significant role in compensating and protecting 
consumers harmed by pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, we believe that products liability should be 
considered as an active component of  the concept of  “drug safety”, which therefore must be intended 
as the sum of  safety regulation and civil liability. 
 Therefore, the question of  interest here is what role do the complex public regulatory schemes 
put in place to ensure safety, leave for the law of  torts and products liability? The question is not easy to 
answer. Looking at some countries, we could say that because the regulation shows several 
shortcomings in practice, the answer appears to be that products liability law has a powerful role to play 
in compensating persons harmed unnecessarily by defective drugs, and some role (if  a lesser one) in 
deterring production and sale of  unsafe products, and promoting drug safety, on the basis of a system 
of  rules which is, in the majority of  cases, is substantially a negligence one37. But if  we look at other 
countries, such as Spain or Germany, the law provides a regime of  strict (or even absolute) liability for 
harms caused by pharmaceutical products. And finally, we must confront with  a contentious doctrine, 
                                                
32  Henderson J. A., Twerski A. D., “Drug designs are different”, Yale Law Journal 151, 2001.  
33  Madden M. S., “The enduring paradox of products liability law relating to prescription pharmaceuticals”, Pace Law Review 
vol. 21, 2000. 
34  It is worth noting that there is a common understanding, especially in US literature, that drug hazard is inherent and 
simply cannot be removed. Now this is true to a certain extent, however, the hazard in some drugs may be reduced or 
eliminated by changing the prescribed dosage, the active ingredients in combination drugs, or the inert ingredients used in a 
drug. For further details see Green M., “Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement (Third): Preliminary 
Reflections”, 30 Seton Hall Law Review 207, 1999. 
35  Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 48.On weaknesses in the regulatory schemes see, for an 
analysis in the 'tort law perspective', Rabin R., “Reassessing Regulatory Compliance”, 88 Georgetown Law Journal 2049, 2000. 
36  See for example Smith R., “The Vagueness of Informed Consent”, 1 Individual Health Law Review 109, 2004. 
37  The topic is discussed by Reimann M., “Liability for detective products at the beginning of the twenty-first century: 
emergence of a worldwide standard?”, American Journal of Comparative Law, 2003. The reference to negligence rules in drug 
litigation will be further explored in the proceeding.  
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started in 2006 in the U.S., which considers that the products approved by the regulatory agencies 
shouldn't undergo tort claims, or, put in different terms, that the marketing approval by the federal 
regulatory agency preempts state tort claims. 
 The following discussion will focus on the liability rules that are applied in the United States 
and in Europe, and how do these rules relate with the regulatory schemes discussed above. An issue of 
particular interest is the manner in which the U.S. system conceives the “state of  the art” of  scientific 
and technical knowledge that somehow differs from the hypothesis in which, in the European system, a 
“development risk” arises.  
 
 – United States 
As already suggested, the key element of  both regulatory and liability assessments is the one of 
“relevant knowledge”. Therefore, the issue of  interest here is to identify the attitude of  product liability 
law towards such concept. In the US, the relevant idea is the one referred to as “state of  the art”, which 
is a weak concept that has never been accurately defined, neither by courts nor by statutes, as it has 
been demonstrated by David G. Owen38, and several other North-American scholars39. More precisely, 
while state statutes or courts, singularly considered, actually have a definition of  what is to be 
considered “state of  the art”, a uniform federal conception (or at least harmonized) is absent, and the 
Restatements on Torts (Second and Third) have not been able (up to now) to give an appropriate answer to 
the question. There are several causes to explain this phenomenon. The simplest one is to look at the 
problem from a semantic point of  view: “state of  the art” is an incomplete phrase: you need to know 
about which particular “state of  the art” you are talking about in a particular situation. In other words 
the question is: state of  the art of  what? The answer depends and varies from state to state, being 
considered in some case the most up-to-date scientific knowledge, in others the industrial customary 
practice40.  
To summarize, in the American products liability law, “state of  the art” is an unrefined concept 
whose meaning and proper role are in continuous evolution41. In the impressive variety of  definitions 
and interpretations of  such a phrase, it is possible to identify a thin common theme emerging from the 
cases and the statutes: “reluctance to impose liability on manufacturers for dangers that were 
unknowable, or unpreventable, at the time their products were sold: reluctance to hold producers 
responsible for risks they cannot control”42. This common theme has lead to a theoretical involution of 
the idea of  “state of  the art” from Restatement 2nd to Restatement 3rd, which is quite interesting and might 
                                                
38  Owen D., Products liability law, Hornbook Series, Thomson West Group, 2005, pp. 675-681. 
39  For example Henderson J. A., Twerski A. D., Products liability – problems and process, 5th edition, ASPEN Publishers, 2004.  
40  Owen D., Products liability law, pp. 677-6781. 
41  As suggested by Owen D., Products liability law, pp. 675-701; see also Fisher D. A., Green M., Powers W.  Jr., Sanders J., 
Products Liability – cases and materials, 3d edition, American Casebook Series, West Group, 2002.  
42  Owen D., Products liability law, p. 675. 
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be helpful to understand the further evolution of  the legal regime of  pharmaceutical products safety in 
the US. Restatement 2nd imposed a strict liability regime for damages caused by defective products, 
adopting the so called “consumer-expectation test” to evaluate the safety of  the products43. Because of 
the harshness of  such a rule, the American Law Institute introduced comment j to Section 402A, regarding 
the duty to warn for producers of  unavoidably unsafe products44. Such a duty is imposed only for 
foreseeable risks (but foreseeability is linked with the most up-to-date scientific knowledge available45). 
Besides, Restatement 3rd is much more producer-friendly oriented, abandoning the straight interpretation 
of  comment j and bringing back the idea of  “reasonableness” which definitely doesn't fit in a strict 
liability regime, but is typically proper of  negligence rules instead. Sections 6(c) of  the Products Liability 
Restatement (3rd) provides: “A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to defective 
design if  the foreseeable risks of  harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in 
relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of  such 
foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class 
of  patients.”46 To fully understand the impact of  such a provision, it is useful to recall that even 
Thalidomide would not have been captured by the Third Restatement test, because of  its value in 
treating leprosy. 
 
 – European Union 
On the other side of  the Ocean the European “development risk”, which is considered the 
European equivalent of  the American “state of  the art”, is a more accurate (although not entirely clear) 
concept, as noticed by Jennifer Stapleton47, among others. A “development risk”, is an unknowable 
risk, that cannot be foreseeable because the state of scientific and technical knowledge, at the time the 
product is put into circulation, is not such as to enable the risk to be identified48. The European Court 
of  Justice has given a quite controversial interpretation of  art. 7 e) of  the EU Directive 374/85, in the 
cases C-300/95 Commission vs United Kingdom, stating that Article 7(e) of  Directive 374/85/EC is not 
specifically directed at the practices and safety standards in use in the industrial sector in question but 
concerns “unreservedly . . . the state of  scientific and technical knowledge including the most advanced 
                                                
43  See Twerski A.D.- Henderson C.J., Products liability – problems and process, 5th edition, ASPEN Publishers, 2004, pp. 321-327. 
44  Unavoidably unsafe as defined by comment k, see supra note 31. 
45  See the leading cases Brown vs Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (California 1988) and Beshada v. John Mansville Products Corp, 1001 
N.J. 221 A.2d 1099 (New Jersey Supreme Court, 1982) 
46  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 6(c). 
47  In Stapleton J., Products Liability, London Butterworths, 1994. 
48  Directive 374/85/EC, art. 7 e): “ It shall be a defence for the producer to prove: . . . . . (e) that the state of scientific and 
technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the 
defect to be discovered.” 
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level of  such knowledge”49. The state of  knowledge is, according to the Court, not that of  which the 
actual producer “actually or subjectively was or could have been apprised, but the objective state of 
scientific and technical knowledge of  which the producer is presumed to have been informed”50. The 
Court does not go further in its argument. For instance, an explanation of  the key phrase “state of 
knowledge” and a tentative definition of  “knowledge” as opposed to “hypothesis” is absent51. The very 
high standard that at first sight the Court sets for producers regarding discoverability, is, moreover, 
limited by the following part of  the Court's analysis. The only basis it offers for the presumption of  the 
producer's knowledge of  the defect is that the relevant knowledge must have been “accessible” at the 
time at which the product was put into circulation but no explanation of  what it means by the word 
“accessible” is offered52, thus leaving considerable margins of  manoeuvre to national courts, and 
reintroducing an element of  “reasonableness” that is in principle excluded by definition in strict liability. 
 We have to say that despite the attempt of  the EU to harmonise the products liability 
legislation in the Member States, the field of  pharmaceutical products liability is still fragmented for two 
sets of  reasons.  
On the one hand there are several and significant exceptions to the general regime, such as the 
provisions of  the German Law regulating pharmaceuticals (Arzneimittelngesetz), and the Spanish Law 
(Ley 22/1994, Sobre Responsabilidad Civil Por Danos Causados por Productos Defectuosos), both providing strict 
liability for pharmaceutical damages, even though those damages were caused by a development risk53. 
This is not the place to discuss in depth the historical reasons that led to this situation. It is however 
worth to recall that Germany was heavily hit by the Thalidomide disaster. The legislation that was in 
place at that time (Germany was the first European country to have a special legislation for 
pharmaceuticals, the statute was adopted in 196154) appeared unable to sufficiently ensure drug security 
or provide a basis for recovery of  damages by injured drug consumers. The new act of  1976 purported 
to eliminate these deficiencies, establishing, among other provisions, strict liability claims against 
damages caused by pharmaceutical products. As regards Spain, the reasons are substantially the same, 
as the country has been hit by four major drug disasters in the space of  three decades55. 
 On the other hand, in its interpretation of  art. 1356 of  Directive 374/85/EC, the Court of 
Justice held that any scheme of  products liability “founded on the same basis as that put in place by the 
                                                
49  Case C-300/95, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom, §26. 
50  Case C-300/95, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom, §27. 
51  Fairgrieve D., Products Liability in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 167-170 
52  Case C-300/95, Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom, §28. 
53  Reimann M., “Liability for detective products at the beginning of the twenty-first century: emergence of a worldwide 
standard?”; and Wandt M., “German approaches to Product Liability”, Texas International Law Journal 34, 1999. 
54  Gesetz uber den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln, 1961.  
55  See for a discussion Vega M.I.A., “The defence of development risks in Spanish Law”, Consum. L.J., 1997. 
56  Art. 13 provides: “This Directive shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have according to the rules of 
the law of contractual or non-contractual liability or a special liability system existing at the moment when this Directive is 
notified.”  
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Directive and not limited to a given sector of  production does not come within any of  the systems of 
liability referred to in article 13 of  the Directive”57. On the basis of  this reasoning, and considering 
pharmaceuticals as a specific “sector of  production”, countries such as France and Italy, apply general 
tort law rules to pharmaceutical products liability claims58. We will come back to these scenarios in the 
proceeding. 
 
 
2. Widening The Divergences (Federal Preemption of  State Tort Law) 
 
As suggested in the Introduction, a link should exist between regulation and products liability. A 
link whose role shall be to foster the availability of  the knowledge meant to assess the safety of  a new 
product. This part of  the paper is dedicated to recent trends in American products liability litigation 
that raise various concerns in light of  the aforementioned goal. 
In  the past recent years, specifically as from 200659, a new doctrine (the doctrine of 
preemption) gained momentum in the area of  drug litigation in the US. Until then, the FDA used to 
consider its risk/benefit analysis as setting a floor but not a ceiling for product safety. FDA approval 
would authorize a product to be marketed, but manufacturers would still be held responsible if  a court 
later decided that a product was defective or a warning was inadequate. Over the past decade, however, 
this view changed in light of  the activism of  policymakers, fiercely stressing the need to bring 
innovative medical treatments to market60. It has been argued, in this perspective, that the FDA review 
process should thus set both floor and ceiling: FDA approval of  a new product shouldn't anymore 
simply indicate that the product can be marketed, but it should be the final word in the safety 
assessment of  such new product. FDA officials who hold this view consider the tort system dangerous. 
According to their view, the threat of  tort liability deters pharmaceutical companies and device makers 
from developing much-needed new technologies61. Whenever those innovations are delayed if  not 
                                                
57  See Case C-183/00 Gonzàlez Sànchez vs Medicina Asturiana SA [2002] ECR I-3901. 
58  See among others Fairgrieve D., Products Liability in Comparative Perspective, p. 221; and Ponzanelli G., “Armonizzazione del 
diritto v. protezione del consumatore”, Danno e Responsabilità, 2002; Busnelli F. D., Ponzanelli G., La responsabilità del 
produttore tra legge speciale e codice civile, in Il danno da prodotti in Italia, Austria, Repubblica Federale di Germania, Svizzera, a cura di S. 
Patti, Padova 1990. 
59  Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 
3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006) (effective June 30, 2006) (21 C.F.R. Pts. 201, 314, 601). 
60 Sharkey C.M., “Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State versus Federal 
Courts”, NYU School of Law, Public Law &Legal Theory research Paper Series, n. 08-04, 2008; Sharkey C.M., “Preemption by 
Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalization of Tort Law”, De Paul Law Review, 56:227, 2007; Struve C.T., “The FDA 
and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”, Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law 
& Ethics, 2005; IOM, “Regulatory Authorities for Drug Safety, in The Future of Drug Safety – Promoting and Protecting the health of 
the Public. 
61  Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”,  p. 
590; and see also for a discussion Philipson T.J., Sun E.C., Goldman D., “The effects of Product Liability Exemption in 
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abandoned altogether, “the cost is felt not merely in financial terms but also in the suffering of  people 
whose illnesses could have been treated with the new drug or device”62. These critics argue that the tort 
system should not be permitted to re-determine product safety, as courts may unduly nullify the 
assessments of  the FDA's expertise63. The risk being that non-expert juries and judges would make 
weaker assessments in terms of  scientific robustness and objectivity64. It has been demonstrated, 
however, that such a statement is inadequate because of  the weakness of  the FDA’s post-marketing 
surveillance process, essentially based on the data furnished by the pharmaceutical industry itself, rather 
than autonomously reached by the agency65. The evolution of  the relationships between products 
liability and products safety in the US shows a significant shift, in the past fifteen years, from a 
consumer-friendly to a much more producer-friendly tendency. It has been argued that the emergence 
of  the doctrine of  preemption promoted by the FDA might be explained in light of  the agency's need 
to regain authority and reliability after the Vioxx scandal which lead to the withdrawal from the market 
of  such a drug66. This shift is proven, for example, by the New Jersey case law, particularly by the case 
Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc, of  March 2007, applying the doctrine of  preemption. This is a decision 
with dangerous potential because of  the active and central role that the New Jersey Supreme Court 
always has had in the history of  the American Products Liability law from the case Beshada v. John 
Mansville Products Corp, to the famous Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, applying section 402A of  Restatement 
2nd in its strictest interpretation. 
The future of  drug litigation in the United States is nonetheless still very unclear. With its ruling 
of  March 4, 2009, the US Supreme Court, in Wyeth vs Levine67, seems, at first sight, to have “overruled” 
the doctrine of  preemption in drug litigation. In this decision, the Supreme Court clearly suggests that 
state tort law can not be considered an obstacle to the achievement of  safety assessments by the FDA, 
                                                                                                                                                            
Presence of the FDA”, NBER Working Paper Series, 15603, 2009. Philipson T.J.- Sun E. , “Is the Food and Drug 
Administration Safe and Effective?”, NBER Working Paper Series, 13561, 2007. 
62  Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”,  p. 
590. 
63  See preeamble to regulation  on “Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and 
Biological Products”, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934. 
64  Empirical data rather indicate that juries do better than their critics assert at handling technical issues, that juries are not 
as eager as some think to award damages against business defendants, and that punitive damages are awarded rarely in 
products liability suits (and mainly in cases involving egregious misbehavior). See on the point Struve C.T., “The FDA and 
the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”, p. 592-593. 
65  There is abundant literature on the point, an author who argued that the FDA’s reliance on the regulated company to 
supply the necessary safety data can lead to problems is McGarity T.O., “Beyond Buckman: Wrongful Manipulation of the 
Regulatory Process in the Law of Torts”, Washburn Law Journal, 41, 2002: 549-559 (“When the onus is on the regulatee to 
provide data establishing that its product is ‘safe and effective’  . . . , the temptation is strong for a company to discount data 
indicating that the product may not meet the statutory test.”); see also Noah B.A., “Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing 
Experiential Data to Promote Patient Welfare”, 49 Catholic University Law Review, 449, 470-71, 2000. 
66   See Merck Press Release of September 30, 2004, available at 
www.merck.com/newsroom/vioxx/pdf/vioxx_press_release_final.pdf  
67  Wyeth vs Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187. 
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but it is rather a complement of  it68. The fact that no Congress statutes clearly provide a preemption 
clause for FDA's decisions goes in this very direction69. Is this the end of  the preemption debate for 
drug litigation70? We suggest that the answer is in the negative.  
On the one hand, as it appears from the facts of the case, the defendant failed to disclose 
relevant information to the FDA, regarding alternative and possibly safer uses of  the drug71. More 
precisely, what the defendant was seeking in Wyeth was not a simple “preemption defence”, but a 
narrower “impossibility by preemption defence”. In other words, the claimant was arguing that it 
couldn't introduce a new element (i.e. the alternative safer use of  the drug) in the labelling on its own 
motion, since such a label had been approved by the FDA. And being the label approved by the FDA, 
the state court was preempted to find the claimant liable for failure-to-warn72. On the other hand, and 
on a more general note, the Court rejected Wyeth argument, according to which tort claims “interfere 
with Congress purpose to entrust an expert agency to make drug labelling decisions that strike a 
balance between competing objectives”73, stating that such an argument relies on an “untenable 
interpretation” of  congressional intent and an “overboard view” of  an agency's power to preempt state 
law74. Thus narrowing down substantially the room for implied preemption. 
 Notwithstanding the clear cut wording of  this particular judgement, it might be too early to 
argue that federal preemption cannot be invoked tout cour in drug cases (whereas it seems hardly 
disputable that it is precluded when the defendant fails to operate proactively on the basis of  all 
information in his possession). As quite colourfully noted by Mary J. Davis, “trying to make sense of 
preemption opinions [of  the Supreme Court] reminds one of  being on a roller coaster […] The 
uncertainty of  where the coaster will go, while exhilarating for the time, is also exhausting and 
frustrating”75. A quite accurate comment, if  we compare Wyeth with the previous high profile implied 
preemption case decided by the Supreme Court, Riegel76, where the Court showed a less narrow and 
                                                
68  Wyeth vs Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, §§ 10-11. 
69  In pharmaceutical products cases, implied preemption was applied, by considering federal agency (FDA) determinations 
as substitutes for congressional intent. Deferring to agency position on preemption of state common law is however 
troublesome, see for a general discussion Davis M.J., “The New Presumption against Preemption”, Hastings Law Journal, 61, 
1217, 2010. 
70  As somehow suggested by scholars such as Owen D.G., “Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in the 
Health care debate”, Conn. Law Review, 42, 2010, pp 733 ff, noting “the continued decline of the federal preemption doctrine 
as a bar to warning adequacy claims against drug manufacturers”; see also Ausness R.C., “The Impact of Wyeth v. Levine on 
FDA Regulation of Prescription Drugs”, 65 Food & Drug Law Journal 247, 2010  
71  Wyeth vs Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, § 6. 
72  See Wyeth vs Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, § 1; see also § 6 where the Court helds: “Impossibility preemption is a demanding 
defence. […] Wyeth has failed to demonstrate that it was impossible for it to comply with both federal and state 
requirements. The CBE regulation permitted Wyeth to unilaterally strengthen its warning, and the mere fact that the FDA 
approved Phenergan's label does not establish that it would have prohibited such a change.” 
73  Wyeth vs Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, at 1199 
74  Wyeth vs Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, at 1199 
75  Davis M.J., “On Restating Products Liability Preemption”, Brooklyn Law Review, 74, 2009, p. 776, noting the high level of 
inconsistency in preemption Supreme Court Judgements over the last two decades. 
76  Riegel, 128 S.Ct. at 1007-1008 
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much broader approach to the issue77. Whether or not preemption applies to drug litigation in state tort 
claims seems, at the moment, quite more complex than a simple yes/no question. The wisest option 
being to wait and see. 
 
 
3. Critiques... 
 
a)...in general 
 
We claim that both scenarios, the European and the American, fail to fully understand the need 
of  an interplay between regulation and liability rules, continuing to consider both regimes separate or 
conflicting rather than complementary. 
From a strictly theoretical perspective, the regulatory and litigation systems could operate 
entirely independently: compliance with regulations would be irrelevant in litigation, and litigation 
outcomes would not directly affect agency regulation. It is however difficult to advocate total 
independence: “it seems clear that the agencies’ expert assessments of  product safety should not be 
irrelevant in litigation arising from asserted safety defects. Rather, the dispute is over what the effect of 
the agency’s safety determinations should be”78. Moreover, as we will argue in the proceedings, even in 
the absence of  formal connections, a strong and substantial interplay between the two regimes exists, 
the question being how to make it work to promote the best availability of  knowledge that is relevant 
for safety assessments. 
As noted above, in the past five years, in the US the FDA’s expert balancing of  product risks 
and benefits has been interpreted as leaving no room for disagreement within the tort system. There is 
no reason (according to this policy) for a tort claim to “second-guess” the FDA’s judgements, and, 
indeed, second-guessing is likely to produce undesirable results as it consists in turning down experts' 
assessments in favour of  judgements made by non-experts79. However, it has also been pointed out that 
the FDA cannot foresee and address all product safety issues ahead of  time, and that the agency may 
not have the ability of  responding quickly enough to those issues when they first arise after a product 
enters the market80. Courts, in the process of  considering the effects of  agencies determinations, have 
                                                
77  Davis M.J., “On Restating Products Liability Preemption”, pp. 770 – 771. 
78  Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”, p. 
609. 
79  See Davis M.J., “The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA”, 48 Boston College Law Review 1089, 
1089-94, 2007. Davis M. J., “Discovering the boundaries: Federal Preemption of Prescritpion Drug Labeling Products 
Liability Actions”, University of Kentuky Law Journal, 2005. This was somehow already  suggested by Posner R., Economic 
Analysis of Law (5th ed.), New York, Aspen Publishers, Inc., 1998. 
80  There is abundant literature on the shortcomings of FDA regulation, see among others Philipson T.J., Sun E.C., 
Goldman D., “The effects of Product Liability Exemption in Presence of the FDA”; Philipson T.J.- Sun E. , “Is the Food 
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thus constantly balanced these competing considerations. This balancing has taken place until 2006 
when the FDA autonomously established that certain types of  its determinations should preclude 
litigation altogether81.  
We do not agree with a model such as the one promoted by the FDA. As it has been 
demonstrated in the field of  general products safety, regulation and liability have to be considered as 
functional complements, because they are  not necessarily functional equivalents82. Neither regulation 
nor liability considered on their own result in parties taking the desirable “first-best” level of  care83. In 
addition to that, we have to notice that in other legal fields, for instance in labour law, the link between 
regulation and liability has become, through time, an essential starting point for any consideration upon 
labour safety84.  
The fragmentation of  the field of  pharmaceutical safety is puzzling. On the one hand, we have 
the US where the doctrine of  preemption has played a significant role in the past years, and might keep 
doing so in the future, on the other hand we have, for example, Germany, where, notwithstanding an 
accurate regulation set by both the EMA and the German Agency on Pharmaceuticals, the 
Arzneimittelngesetz, imposes strict liability on drug manufacturers for any damage caused by their product 
even though it was unknowable85. Both these solutions are not satisfying in the light of  an efficient 
balance of  consumers protection and incentives to innovation. 
As it appears clearly from these two examples, even in the absence of  structural connections 
between the litigation and regulatory systems, strong substantial connections exist. In the US case,  
when FDA regulation preempts state tort claims, the regulatory system excludes the litigation system. 
Because no federal cause of  action currently exists on product liability, preempting state tort claims 
                                                                                                                                                            
and Drug Administration Safe and Effective?”; Davis M.J., “The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the 
FDA”; Davis M. J., “Discovering the boundaries: Federal Preemption of Prescritpion Drug Labeling Products Liability 
Actions”; and Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of 
Litigation”. 
81  We are here working on the hypothesis that despite Wyeth preemption will continue to apply to drug cases. In the 
proceeding we will address the opposite hypothesis. 
82  Cafaggi F., Institutional Framework of European Private Law, pp. 191 and following. 
83  Shavell S., “A model of the socially optimal use of liability and regulation”, NBER Working Paper Series n° 1220, 1983. 
84  Shavell S., Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1987. 
85  Arzneimittelgesttz § 84: “If, as a result of the administration of a drug intended for human use, which was distributed to the 
consumer within the purview of the present Law and which is subject to compulsory marketing authorization or is 
exempted by ordinance from the need for a marketing authorization, a person is killed or the body or the health of a person 
is substantially injured, the pharmaceutical entrepreneur who placed the drug on the market within the purview of the 
present law shall be obliged to compensate the injured party for the harm caused. The liability to compensate shall only exist 
if:  
 1.when used in accordance with its intended purpose, the drug has harmful effects which exceed the limits considered 
tolerable in the light of current medical knowledge and which have their origin in the development or manufacturing 
process, or,  
 2.the harm has occurred as a result of labelling, expert information or instructions for use which do not comply with 
current medical knowledge.” See also Wandt M., “German approaches to Product Liability”. 
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eliminates the very possibility of  lawsuits concerning pharmaceutical product safety86. In a world where  
regulation struggles to confront with the issue of  a production process that is more and more multi-
localized, and where the number of  regulatory bodies transnationally involved in the approval process 
increases,  a pure “regulatory compliance” shield against tort claims appears to be a risky choice in light 
of  the need to promote the best availability of  “relevant knowledge” in assessing the safety of  a 
product, before and after its marketing. The increasing number of  said regulatory bodies involved 
across the world in the approval process of  a new drug, combined with the incomplete international 
harmonisation of  the relevant guidelines, generate in fact a non-negligible  level of  uncertainty. 
Besides, in the German case, the harshness of  the pharmaceutical products liability law 
potentially renders regulatory compliance totally valueless, so that non virtuous behaviours might be 
encouraged87. In addition to that, a structural separation between regulation and liability eliminates a 
potentially useful “cross-fertilization” between regulators and courts, causing what we might call a 
“pure knowledge loss”. Since the concept of  “relevant knowledge”88 is of  the greatest importance in 
assessing responsibility in the field of  marketed drugs (where all decisions are made with reference to 
the state-of-the-art of  scientific and technical knowledge), such a loss is not acceptable. 
 
b)...deepening the critiques – United States 
 
 It has been accurately argued that permitting FDA approval to preclude the possibility of  tort 
liability does more than ensure that product safety decision are reserved to the FDA, because 
preemption of  tort litigation removes the opportunity for litigation to aid the FDA in its goal of 
monitoring product safety89. Moreover, taking into account the classic compensatory function of  tort 
law, preemption de facto denies compensation to persons harmed by a product for the mere fact of 
being approved by the agency even if  they were harmed after a safety problem first occurred but before 
the FDA took regulatory action to remove the product from the market or require additional warnings 
– and this is the case more often than one could think due to the weaknesses of  the FDA's post-
marketing surveillance system90. Moreover, there are serious concerns over the level of  safety that 
                                                
86  Davis M.J., “The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA”; Davis M. J., “Discovering the 
boundaries: Federal Preemption of Prescritpion Drug Labeling Products Liability Actions”; and Struve C.T., “The FDA and 
the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”. 
87  As pointed out by Wandt M., “German approaches to Product Liability”. 
88  Mildred M., “The development risk defence”, in Fairgrieve D., Products Liability in Comparative Perspective, p. 179. 
89  Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”, p. 
615 ff. 
90  The issue is raised by, among others, IOM, “Regulatory Authorities for Drug Safety, in The Future of Drug Safety – 
Promoting and Protecting the health of the Public; Philipson T.J., Sun E.C., Goldman D., “The effects of Product Liability 
Exemption in Presence of the FDA”; Philipson T.J.- Sun E. , “Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and Effective?”; 
and Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation”, 
who accurately describes the differences in the budgets dedicated to the post- as opposed to the pre- marketing surveillance 
procedures, the post-marketing being underfunded and least than perfectly organized. 
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regulation alone can provide. In particular, the pharmaceutical regulatory system is not without its 
critics. The principal complaints that are relevant for the present purposes are those of  potential 
systemic bias, secrecy, and the potential for fraudulent production of  safety data, especially in 
toxicology or clinical research91. The recent Vioxx case, in which Merck has consciously not disclosed 
relevant safety data relating to well-known risks of adverse reactions is a demonstration that those 
concerns do have relevant grounds92. 
 As suggested by Christopher Hodges, “it is undoubtedly true that the system is complex and 
provides a number of  competing interests which a properly regulated society must seek to balance”93. 
To describe the scenario, the term “multi-regulation”94 has been used by scholars. The very 
considerable sums of  money that can be involved in the success or failure of  pharmaceutical products95 
give raise to major concerns. It is particularly important in this sector that there should be “continuous 
confidence in the appropriateness and strength of  the design and operation of  the system, and 
rigourous compliance with its regulatory standards, through periodic review of  its operation and 
transparency”96.  
 There is a risk here to conclude with an assertion that the system is biased toward the interests 
of  industry over the ones of  patients and public health97. As it has been accurately argued, “modern 
drug regulation is not a proxy for medical accidents and the misfortunes of  drug disasters but, above all, 
                                                
91  For discussion of whether unfavourable studies may not be published or reported quickly enough see: Hodges C., 
European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 48; Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, 
Compensation and the Role of Litigation”; and from a more “journalistic perspective: “SSRIs: Suicide Risk and 
Withdrawal”, Lancet, 361, June 2003; Laurance J., “Sexorat Ban Raises Doubts over Drug Licensing System”, The Independent, 
11 June 2003. 
92  For a discussion of the issue see among others Daemmrich A.A., Pharmacopolitics – Drug Regulation in the United States and 
Germany, pp. 88 and following. 
93  Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 47. 
94 Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 47 quoting Hancer L., “Pharmaceutical Policy and Regulation: 
Setting the Pace in the European Community”, in  Davis P., Contested Ground: Public Purpose and Private Interest in the Regulation 
of Prescription Drugs, Oxford University Press, 1996 
95  The average cost of discovering and developing a new drug is now put at over $800 million and rising at an annual rate of 
7.4% above general price inflation: Boston Consulting Group, A Revolution in R&D: How Genomics and Genetics are 
Transforming the Biopharmaceutical Industry, Boston, 2003; DiMasi J., Hanson R.W., Grabowski G., “The Price of Innovation: 
New Estimates of Drug Development Costs”, Journal of Health Economy, 22, 2003: 151-85. It is well known that the potential 
profits can be enormous. It has been commented that the increasing cost of drug development is likely to promote the 
situation where companies invest only in the development of those new drugs that are expected to yield peak annual sales 
greater than $500 million: Rawlins M.D., “Cutting the Costs of Drug Development?”, Nature, 3, April 2004, 360. 
96  Hodges C., European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety, p. 48, and see Medawar C., Hardon A., Medicines Out of Control? 
Antidepressant and the Conspiracy of Goodwill, Amsterdam 2004, and its review Collier J., “Regulating Regulators”, The Lancet, 
363, June 2004, claim that regulatory controls are creaking in their antiquity, the industry creates diseases and promotes ill-
health, and the regulatory authority exercises the functions of the government because of the complexities involved, thereby 
favouring technocracy over democracy. In this light, for the American Scenario, see Avorn J., MD, Powerful Medicines -The 
Benefits Risks and Costs of Prescription Drugs, Vintage Books, 2005. For a converse view that medicine safety is well regulated, 
see  Silcock J., Pritchard C., To Heal and to Harm: An Economic View of Drug Safety, London, Routledge, 2003. Many 
investigations are in course over the extent to which medicines regulatory agencies are independent of the pharmaceutical 
industries, and bans have been announced on regulators and their advisers holding shares in relevant companies, Kanavos 
P., Ross-Degnan D., “Measuring, Monitoring and Evaluating Policy Outcomes in the Pharmaceutical Sector, in Mossialos 
E. et al., Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe: Striving for Efficiency, Equity and Quality, Open University Press, 2004 
97  Abraham J., Lewis G., Regulating Medicines in Europe, London 2000, p. 78. 
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a product of  the state's negotiation with, and accommodation of, organised industrial interests”98. 
Therefore, the argument here is that as the outcome of  safety regulation is substantially political99, as a 
result of  negotiation, there is an urgent need for an accessible, transparent and effective tool to bring 
back pharmaceutical product safety into the proper boundaries of  a legal issue. What we do believe is 
that such a tool exists and has to be found in tort law. 
 Supporters for FDA regulation to preclude tort litigation can hardly meet the objection that the 
agency may not be in a position to discover all relevant safety information, nor act promptly enough 
upon the information that it does receive concerning safety issues. It thus seems only reasonable to 
claim that the tort system should maintain the ability of  re-assessing product safety in light of  the 
results of  the discovery process. As the Supreme Court stated in Wyeth tort litigation functions as a 
complement to safety regulation and cannot be considered an obstacle to it100. It could theoretically be 
true that a carefully designed regulatory compliance defence might attempt to improve post-marketing 
surveillance, for instance by precluding liability exclusively in cases where the defendant had accurately 
complied with regulatory requirements, including full disclosure requirements101. In light of  this 
reasoning, proponents have urged that the defence should be available only where there was full 
disclosure of  all relevant safety information102. But due to the recently experienced shortcomings of 
FDA's performances, it seems quite unduly optimistic to expect the agency to act quickly and 
effectively in addressing all emerging safety problems, thus undermining a very prerequisite of  the 
defence (the ability of  regulation alone to provide a high level of  safety). Moreover,  we shall stress that 
a regulatory compliance defence could very well have the paradoxical effect of  reducing a company’s 
incentive to work proactively to address emerging safety issues103, as the task would be entirely 
devolved to the FDA (which, again, seems less than advisable). A model based on the equation 
“disclosure = shield vs tort claims” would incentivize manufacturers to inundate the FDA with 
                                                
98  Abraham J., Lewis G., Regulating Medicines in Europe, p. 79. 
99  For a general discussion of the topic see Ogus A.I., Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press, 
2004. 
100  Wyeth vs Levine, 129 S.Ct. 1187, §§ 10-11. 
101  As suggested by Struve C.T., “The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation and the Role 
of Litigation”, p. 615. On this issue, Michael Green has however pointed out that incorporating such nuances into the 
regulatory compliance defence will render that defence complex and costly to litigate. Green M.D., “Statutory Compliance 
and Tort Liability:  Examining the Strongest Case”, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, 30, 1997.  
102  See ALI Reporters' Study, “Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury”, 1991, arguing that a regulatory compliance 
defence should apply only if the defendant “publicly disclosed to the relevant regulatory agency any material information . . . 
of which it has reason to be aware . . . concerning the risks posed by the defendant’s activities and/or the means of 
controlling them,” and stating that the requirement should “extend to information indicating that agency standards or tests 
may be inadequate or inappropriate”.  
103  As Michael Green has noted, “with a regulatory compliance defence available, manufacturers would no longer have an 
incentive to seek labelling changes that would disclose additional risks discovered in the post-marketing period. The impetus 
for such changes would be left to the FDA . . . . The specter of inadequate resources available to the FDA makes this role reversal of 
significant concern [emphasis added]”. Green M.D., “Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability:  Examining the Strongest Case”. 
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information, rendering its ability to provide thorough assessments nearly impossible104. 
 On a different perspective, if  we were to assume that the “roller coaster” is finally over and that 
the ruling of  the Supreme Court in the Wyeth case goes in the direction of  a full overruling of  the 
federal preemption of  state tort law in drug litigation cases105, what claimants would be left with is 
section 6 (c) of  the Restatement Third106, which provides a negligence regime that can not be considered 
satisfactory for safety purposes. We believe that the situation would present substantial analogy107 with 
the regime that is in place in the EU where the Products Liability Directive 374/85/EC is applied. We 
will therefore discuss the issue in the following paragraph. 
 
c) ...deepening the critiques – European Union 
 
 The European scenario is different. There is no such thing as preemption in the EU, where the 
EMA has been playing a crucial role in the harmonisation of  the pharmaceutical safety regulation, but 
by no means has it the authority (nor the intention) to displace tort litigation. The two questions here 
concern, on the one hand, (1) the harmonisation of liability rules, and on the other hand (2) the links 
between the two systems of  regulation and liability. The two problems are somehow related. 
 Several studies on the functioning of  the regulatory regime of  pharmaceutical safety in the EU 
reach the conclusion that, even though it isn't perfect, such a regime is accepted, quite harmonised 
(especially after the adoption of  the EC Directive 2001/83), and quite effective in ensuring pre- and 
post- marketing surveillance108.  
 (1) As regards tort law, however, harmonisation of  pharmaceutical products liability in Europe 
remains chimeric, for two substantial reasons. The first and most obvious one is the presence of  special 
regimes specifically put in place in this field by some Member States, especially Germany and Spain109. 
                                                
104  This claim is stressed by Philipson T.J., Sun E.C., Goldman D., “The effects of Product Liability Exemption in Presence 
of the FDA”; and see also Philipson T.J.- Sun E. , “Is the Food and Drug Administration Safe and Effective?”; Green M.D., 
“Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability:  Examining the Strongest Case”. 
105  It would be hard to claim with certainty that this is the case due the specific facts of the judgement in question, and to 
the swinging attitude of the Supreme Court in preemption rulings, as discussed supra. 
106  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, § 6(c): “A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to 
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its 
foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic 
benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients.” 
107  Substantial as it provides a negligence regime, but the specific rule is way more producer-friendly in the US, since, as 
already recalled, the relevant section of the Restatement provides that: “A prescription drug or medical device is not 
reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are sufficiently 
great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of such foreseeable 
risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of patients”. 
108  For a comprehensive discussion see Feldshreiber P., The Law and Regulation of Medicines, Oxford University Press, 2008. It 
must be noted, however, that the system is still regionally shaped. And this creates a series of problems as regards the ability 
of such a system to confront with the globalization of the production and testing process. 
109  Germany: Gesetz uber den Verkehr mit Arzneimitteln, 1976; Spain: Ley 22/1994, Sobre Responsabilidad Civil Por Danos Causados 
por Productos Defectuosos 
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The second reason is that the implementing process of  the EC Directive 374/1985 on Product Liability 
has been long and complex, and the outcomes are still not entirely clear, due to the reluctance of  the 
Member States to retrieve from their judicial and doctrinal interpretations of  the subject in favour of  a 
centralised model that is, at least in some cases, less favourable for the consumer (like in France or in 
Italy). With its rulings of  year 2002110 the European Court of  Justice attempted to put an end to the 
debate by stating that the model provided by the Directive, despite the literal wording of  article 13111, 
has to be considered the only general system of  product liability in the EU, and that parallel regimes 
can survive only if  they provide liability systems of  a different type, or special liability systems relating 
to specific types of  products. That means, as a consequence, that the ruling of  the ECJ in the case 
Commission vs UK, on the proper meaning of  the development risk defence, has to be considered the 
valid interpretation of  the defence across Europe in the application of  the Directive. So in the Member 
States in which pharmaceutical cases undergo the Directive's regime, a producer will be held to the 
Directive's standard, whereas in Member States having a special regime, the producer will be held to 
such a different standard, and there is more. In Member States applying general tort law provisions to 
specific products (such as pharmaceuticals), the standard the producer will have to reach will change 
again. A hypothetical  example might help to understand the issue.  
 A German firm produces a pharmaceutical product and has a marketing authorisation that 
permits the firm to market such a product in Germany, Italy and England. A year later, consumers 
suffer damages from the consumption of  the product. In Germany, plaintiffs will be able to obtain full 
compensation under the Arzneimittelgesetz by simply proving that they suffered damages from the 
pharmaceutical112. The producer will be responsible on a strict liability basis. Besides, in England, the 
producer will be able to defend himself, if  he proves that the damage came from a development risk, as 
interpreted by the Court of  Justice. That means that knowledge of  the risk (if  it existed at the moment 
the product entered the market) was not reasonably and objectively accessible and obtainable for the 
producer113. Finally, in Italy, if  we assume the applicability of  Article 2050 cc114 to this type of  claims115, 
                                                
110  Case C-52/00 Commission vs France [2002] ECR I-3827; and Case C-183/00 Gonzàlez Sànchez vs Medicina Asturiana SA 
[2002] ECR I-3901. 
111  Directive 374/85/EC, article 13: “The Directive shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have according 
to the rules of contractual or non-contractual liability or a special liability system existing at the moment when this Directive 
is notified.” 
112  Arzneimittelgesttz § 84. 
113 This interpretation suggest a substantial analogy with the negligence regime that is provided by Section 6 (c) of the 
Restatement Third on Torts.  
114  Art. 2050 of the Italian civil code provides: “Chiunque cagiona danno ad altri nello svolgimento di un'attività pericolosa, 
per sua natura o per la natura dei mezzi adoperati, è tenuto al risarcimento, se non prova di avere adottato tutte le misure 
idonee a evitare il danno”. 
115 Which can be the case if we consider that general tort law rules can be applied as special liability rules for specific types 
of products (as pharmaceuticals are), see case Cass civ., 29 April 2005, n.8981: “Posto che la disciplina della responsabilità da 
prodotti difettosi si affianca e non si sostituisce alla disciplina codicistica sulla responsabilità per danno [...] il produttore risponde dei 
danni cagionati dal vizio di progettazione del suo prodotto qualora siano provati la sua colpa nella causazione dell'evento, ed 
il nesso causale tra il vizio della cosa ed il pregiudizio.” 
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the plaintiff  will be able to chose who to sue: the German producer, or the Italian supplier. 
Furthermore, for the producer (or supplier) to avoid liability the burden of  proof is harsher than under 
the Directive's provision, since the defendant has to show he took “all appropriate measures to avoid 
the damage”,  in the way such a provision is interpreted by the courts116. Clearly the outcomes of  these 
three imaginary lawsuits could be different, showing different attitudes towards consumer safety across 
the EU. So, again, is pharmaceutical products liability harmonised in the EU? the answer is no, and it 
doesn't seem that such a trend is likely to change. 
 (2) The second question goes with the first. How are the regulatory and the litigation systems 
linked? There are two interesting provisions in the EC Directive 2001/83 on pharmaceutical safety.   
 The first one is in article 25: “Authorisation shall not affect the civil and criminal liability of  the 
manufacturer and, where applicable, of  the marketing authorisation holder.” 
 The second is in article 61.4: “The fact that the competent authority do not refuse a marketing 
authorisation pursuant to paragraph 2 or a change to the labelling or the package leaflet pursuant to 
paragraph 3 does not alter the general legal liability of  the manufacturer or as appropriate the marketing 
authorisation holder.” 
 What is “the general legal liability of  the manufacturer”? To which regime of  civil liability does 
Directive 2001/83 refer itself? Aims of  systemic coherence would suggest that it refers to the Product 
Liability Directive, which was intended to cover “all movables”, therefore including pharmaceuticals. 
That is the case for example in the UK. But here rises a problem of  linkage between the two regimes. 
The Product Liability Directive, given the defence provided by Article 7(e), limits its effects to the 
moment the product enters the market. The relevant knowledge to be considered to assess a producer's 
liability, is the knowledge available at that moment. The ECJ made this point clear in its ruling against 
France117 (the implementing legislation of  which rendered the development risk defence available only 
to the producer that could prove a ten years monitoring after the product entered the market)118. The 
consequence is that the Directive's regime of  product liability cuts out the whole pharmacovigilance 
post-marketing period that will therefore fall into the boundaries of  a different liability regime, in case 
of  damages, obeying to different rules (such as negligence). It has been pointed out that such an 
outcome is paradoxical119. Liability rules, which are supposed to play a role ex-post in risk management 
are bound to the ex-ante state of  knowledge, whereas regulation (with the pharmacovigilance system) is 
taking care of  the ex-post, while regulation is typically meant to prevent adverse events (and therefore 
                                                
116  The producer has to show positively that he took all possible measures and techniques to avoid the damage, even the 
most advanced and abstractly possible ones, no matter the costs or the hardness of the feasibility; for a discussion see  
Recano P., La responsabilità civile da attività pericolose, CEDAM, 2001, pp. 200-210. 
117  Case C-52/00 Commission vs France [2002] ECR I-3827. 
118 Such a legislation was overruled in the above mentioned case, explicitly because the two fields were meant to be kept 
separated. 
119  Cafaggi F., The institutional framework of European Private Law, pp. 191 and following. 
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plays its role mainly ex-ante)120. In other words, for pharmaceutical products, the Product Liability 
Directive doesn't seem to work. And in the light of  enhancing consumers safety, such a fragmentation 
goes to the detriment of  both the access to justice and the level of  protection (if  damages occur outside 
the boundaries of  the Directive and the consumer has to sue in negligence, he will have to prove the 
fault of  the defendant, which is, as it has been deeply discussed by lawyers and scholars, extremely 
difficult)121. Basically, in countries where pharmaceuticals undergo the discipline of  the Product Liability 
Directive, the link between regulation and liability provides a shape shifting liability regime, depending 
on the timing of  the damage and of  the related knowledge. 
 In Member States such as Germany or Spain, however, the relevant liability regime will 
definitely be the special regime put in place by national laws (such as the Arzneimittelgesetz). Therefore, a 
producer will be held to a standard of  strict liability, with no defence, all along the regulatory process 
(both ex-ante and ex-post). Such a regime renders de facto any regulatory compliance by the manufacturer 
valueless, and this might discourage producers from any innovative research, as well as encourage non 
virtuous behaviour, such as moral hazards122. In those countries, the link between the two systems 
consists in the latter (liability) erasing the former (regulation) in cases of  damages caused by 
pharmaceuticals. 
 The most interesting scenarios are those of  countries that apply general tort law provisions as 
special product liability regimes for pharmaceutical products. That is the case in Italy. We believe that 
the application of   Article 2050 cc as interpreted by the courts is the most effective among those we 
have analysed, being our first goal the protection of  consumers without unreasonably sacrificing the 
interests of  the producers (whose incentives to innovate are deeply influenced by the related risks). 
First, in any case of  damages caused by pharmaceuticals, the Italian judicial model of  pharmaceutical 
product liability ensures the applicability of  the same regime regardless to the timing of  the damage and 
of  the related knowledge (contrary to those countries where pharmaceuticals undergo the discipline of 
the Directive). Secondly, there is no development risk defence (which implies a 'negative proof' that the 
state of  knowledge wasn't such as to enable the existence of  the defect to be discovered, with all the 
uncertainties related to the “state of  knowledge” brought in by such a defence), but a burden of  proof, 
upon the producer, to positively demonstrate he took all appropriate measures to avoid the damage, 
including even those only abstractly possible, no matter the costs or the feasibility123. Such a provision 
fits quite well with the pharmacovigilance system, as it ensures the possibility of  a cross-fertilisation 
                                                
120 Cafaggi F., The institutional framework of European Private Law, pp. 191 and following. 
121  A few words to recall the origins of product liability in the US and the EU. In both scenarios, the first concern was to 
shift the burden of proof from the claimant to the defendant, in order to balance the asymmetric distribution of information 
and economic means. For an overview see among others Ponzanelli G., La responsabilità civile - Profili di diritto comparato, Il 
Mulino, 1992. 
122  As stated by Wandt M., “German approaches to Product Liability”. 
123 See Italian cases: Cass civ., 29 April 2005, n.8981; Tribunal of Venice, 14 February 2005; Tribunal of Rome, 20 April 
2002, Diritto e Giustizia, 2002; Cass civ. 27 July 1991 n.8395, Rep. Foro It., 1992; Cass civ. 15 July 1987 n.6241, Foro It, 1988. 
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between the litigation and the regulatory system, the latter being likely to get enriched by the outcomes 
of  litigation124. Therefore, such a regime has the potential to avoid the risk of  a loss of  knowledge. On 
the other hand, regulatory compliance wouldn't loose its value (as it happens in Germany), since an 
undiscoverable damage (as interpreted by the courts in the application of  Article 2050 cc) wouldn't 
imply liability for the producer. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 The link between liability and regulation remains weak125. As for the European Union, there are 
no clear regulations or even guidelines on how the two systems should positively interact in order to 
reach an optimal level of  consumer protection. Moreover, if  we focus on tort law it must be recalled 
that product liability claims are extremely occasional in the EU. A serious investigation on the issue of 
access to justice is needed here, since at the moment there appear to be substantial obstacles, namely 
the cost of  litigation, and the absence of  collective actions. The Vioxx case provides a good example: in 
the US a massive class action led to a settlement worth 4,8 billion dollars. Individual cases have been 
started in the EU as well, but on a dramatically smaller scale, and there is no access to clear data 
regarding such settlements. As for what concerns the current situation in the United States it in uneasy 
to draw precise conclusions. Criticisms to the doctrine of  preemption have been raised along the paper. 
Was the doctrine to be considered overruled after Wyeth, the situation in both sides of  the ocean would 
be still unsatisfactory in light of  the “negligence” nature of  the liability rules provided by both the 
Restatement Third and the Product Liability Directive as interpreted by the ECJ. 
 As suggested in the Introduction, production and testing of  new drugs are nowadays highly 
globalized phenomena. However, we have observed in the paper that rules are still focused on national 
or regional areas. Regulators are struggling to confront with such an issue. The increasing number of 
bodies involved across the world in the approval process of  a new drug, combined with the incomplete 
international harmonisation of  the relevant regulatory guidelines, generate a non-negligible  level of 
uncertainty. A possible answer to such uncertainty could be found in the regulatory role of  tort law 
rules. We believe that a good beginning in linking the regulation and the liability systems, towards a 
better availability of  relevant knowledge, might be to give to the law of  tort an autonomous role in 
identifying the proper conduct to adopt in the borderline field of  what can be known and what can’t be 
known. 
                                                
124  See among others Green M.D., “Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability:  Examining the Strongest Case” at 482 
(“Sometimes it is the tort system that uncovers instances of non-compliance with FDA regulatory standards, rather than the 
FDA itself.”); and generall Viscusi K., Regulation through Litigation. 
125  See Cafaggi F., The institutional framework of European Private Law, pp. 191 and following, according to whom such a topic 
is still poorly analysed and understood. 
